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Resumen
La decisión entre mantener o sacrificar la moneda nacional está influida por la comparación de los
beneficios de la flexibilidad macroeconómica derivada de un sistema de cambio flotante y una
política monetaria independiente, con los costos microeconómicos derivados de una unión
monetaria o adopción unilateral de una moneda extranjera. Este trabajo analiza esta decisión para el
caso chileno. El desarrollo financiero del país y su estabilidad macroeconómica implica incurrir en
bajos costos microeconómicos y de eficiencia al mantenerse el peso. La revisión de los criterios de
área monetaria óptima muestra que Chile no es un candidato natural para integrar una unión
monetaria con potenciales socios en América Latina, NAFTA o la Unión Europea. La dolarización
unilateral es aún menos beneficiosa. Para un país que, como Chile, está sujeto a intensos shocks
idiosincráticos y a significativas rigides tranistorias de precios y salarios, un tipo de cambio flexible
y una política monetaria independiente anclada a una meta de inflación constituyen una opción de
régimen que domina a las demás.
Abstract
The choice between maintaining or giving up the national currency is determined by putting on
balance the benefits of macroeconomic flexibility derived from a floating exchange rate and an
independent monetary policy, and the microeconomic benefits derived from joining a currency
union or adopting unilaterally a foreign currency. This paper assesses this choice for Chile. The
country’s financial development and macroeconomic stability imply low microeconomic and
efficiency costs in sticking to the peso. An evaluation of optimal currency-area criteria shows that
Chile is not a natural candidate for joining a monetary union with prospective partners in Latin
America, NAFTA, or the European Union. Unilateral dollarization is even less beneficial. Among
Southern Hemisphere countries with various exchange rate regimes, Chile would gain the least from
giving up its national currency. For a country like Chile, subject to large idiosyncratic shocks and
significant temporary price and wage rigidity, a flexible exchange rate and an independent monetary
policy anchored to an inflation target comprise the dominant regime choice.
_______________________
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I.  INTRODUCTION
The start of the third millenium marks a new milestone in Chile’s monetary and
exchange-rate regime. A quarter century after initiating in 1974 the world’s most gradualist
anti-inflation program, Chile’s endemic inflation has finally been defeated. Price
stabilization has been attained in the sense of reaching inflation levels that are slightly
above industrial-country levels and consistent with the Central Bank’s medium-term
inflation target range of 2-4% per year. This achievement tops a decade of successful
application of a monetary framework based on inflation targeting by a Central Bank that
gained statutory and factual independence in late 1989.
More recently – in September 1999 – the Central Bank adopted a floating exchange
rate regime, suspending the preceding crawling exchange-rate band system that had been in
place since 1985. Abandoning the exchange rate band avoids incurring in policy
inconsistencies that arise whenever a conflict emerges between the inflation target and the
exchange rate objective implicit in the band. A floating exchange rate regime coupled to a
monetary framework based on explicit inflation targeting provides the required policy
consistency. Certainly Chile is not alone in realizing this and acting accordingly. An
explosive number of industrial, transition, and developing countries have recently adopted
or are in the process of starting currency floats cum inflation targeting.
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Yet it is both relevant and timely to question this selection of monetary/exchange
rate regime for Chile. This country – like most others in the world today – faces two basic
choices in this regard. One alternative is to maintain and strengthen the current
monetary/exchange rate regime based on floating and inflation targeting, hence sticking to
the Chilean peso. The main alternative to this choice is to give up the national currency,
either by adopting unilaterally another country’s currency (“dollarization”) or by adopting
multilaterally a common currency with other countries (monetary union). A third
alternative – sticking to the peso and adopting some variant of inflexible exchange rate
regime that could range from a currency board to a broad exchange rate band – is neither
relevant nor popular anymore. Recent world economic history has been unkind to countries
pursuing inflexible regimes, and Chile has certainly not been an exception to this
experience.
The choice between maintaining or giving up a national currency is determined by
putting on balance the macroeconomic benefits derived from macro flexibility under a
floating exchange rate system and an independent monetary policy and the microeconomic
benefits derived from lower transaction costs and improved economic integration under a
currency union. However a precise quantitative evaluation of the latter costs and benefits is
not easy to undertake. First it is hard to draw up a clear-cut counterfactual scenario that
isolates regime choice (say, a currency union) from other policy choices (say, fiscal, trade,
and financial reform). Second, there is disagreement about the empirical magnitudes
involved. In addition, political factors and cost/benefit analysis are as important as purely
economic factors in selecting an exchange rate/monetary regime. Monetary union is
                                                          
1 A comparative review of inflation targeting experiences in the 1990s, with some focus on Chile’s
experience, is found in Landerretche, Morandé and Schmidt-Hebbel (2000).2
typically part of a much larger international agreement that involves economic integration
and advanced stages of political agreement or union, as exemplified by European Monetary
Union (EMU).
Aware of the above mentioned methodological limitations that surround this issue,
this paper reviews and evaluates the two basic regime choices for the case of Chile. From
the available evidence the main conclusions is that Chile is better off with the peso than by
adopting either the dollar or a common currency shared by potential partners. Dollarization
or monetary union in the near future would impose more costs than benefits.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews arguments and evidence
provided by the literature on the choice of exchange rate / monetary regimes. Section III
evaluates this choice for Chile in the context of Chile’s and its prospective partner’s recent
experience and current structural features. Section IV concludes and discusses policy
implications.
II.  CHOICE OF EXCHANGE RATE / MONETARY REGIMES: THE ARGUMENTS
AND THE EVIDENCE
When Milton Friedman agitated the flag of the floating exchange rate camp back in
the early 1950s, at the heights of the Bretton Woods era, academics and policy makers
agonized over whether the nominal value of the national currency should be pegged to the
US dollar or allowed to be set by the market. But nobody was seriously considering giving
up the national currency. In the following decades, the debate moved toward considering
the benefits of hybrid systems, which naturally involved maintaining the national currency.
Not too long ago, a survey of the theoretical literature concluded: “Neither of the extremes
of permanently fixed or completely flexible exchange rates is optimal in seeking
macroeconomic stability. Instead, some intermediate degree of flexibility is more likely to
succeed in stabilizing the economy in response to random shocks” (Aghevli, Khan, and
Montiel 1991). What these authors had in mind, like many others at that time or before
(Frenkel and Aizenman, 1982, Fukuda, 1992), was that macroeconomic stability was not
simply price stability but rather a broader concept referring to a smooth business cycle.
According to this view, having an extra policy instrument such as an adjustable exchange
rate was beneficial because there were too many objectives to be chased.
This view has been subsequently revised in light of new developments in the 1990s
that have helped in refocusing the issues. First, globalization of capital markets has
occurred, reflected in a massive increase in capital flows toward emerging economies and
subsequent contagion and capital flow reversal in the aftermath of the Asian crisis.
Financial globalization challenges the conventional assumption that national moneys are
only demanded by people of the corresponding country. Competition of securities issued in
different currencies, directly or through financial derivatives, is taking place at an
unprecedented scale. Policy makers can do little to protect national currencies from
competition of other monies in global investor portfolios by appealing to capital controls or
exchange restrictions. As a result, hybrid systems are easier to attack and the national
governments are less powerful to defend them. Hence, it becomes increasingly difficult to3
use the exchange rate as a policy instrument to achieve macroeconomic stability.
Furthermore, in a financially integrated environment, hybrid systems may also be
inefficient since markets will have difficulties in assessing the exchange rate risk as
authorities have discretionary powers to intervene in exchange rate markets.
The second development has been the successful implementation of the Maastricht
agreement and the start of European monetary union (EMU). The adoption of the Euro by
(initially) 11 member countries in January 1999 has reignited the 1960s debate on the
merits and drawbacks of currency unions (more popular in the 1960s), that is, the cost-
benefit analysis about giving up the national currency in favor of a regional money. As a
third and (up to now) region-specific development, a debate is going on in Latin America
about a particular way of sacrificing the national currency, i.e., by unilaterally adopting
another country’s currency. “Dollarization” is a regime option, which Ecuador is currently
trying to adopt and Argentina, as well as some Central American countries are considering.
Therefore today’s debate is moving away from whether to peg or to float the
currency and towards whether to have a national currency whose value is determined by the
market or to replace it by another country’s money or a regional supranational currency.
The international evidence regarding exchange rate regimes reflects this. Figure 1 depicts
the world’s country distribution by degree of exchange regime flexibility for four years:
1976, 1986, 1998, and 1999. The mostly U-shaped curves show that intermediate regimes
of limited flexibility have not been popular during the last quarter century. Regimes of
limited exchange rate flexibility and of exchange rates adjusted by specific indicators are
not more frequent than in 10% of all countries. Moreover, a major trend shift toward more
flexible systems took place until 1998. Pegged regimes (comprising currency unions,
currency boards, and fixed exchange rates) dropped precipitously, from 86% of countries in
1976 (i.e., already well after the collapse of the Bretton Woods era of US$ pegs) to 35% in
1998. Free floats increased during the same period from 1% to 25% of countries. However
since the start of EMU one year ago, the number of countries with pegs (including those
with currency unions) raised again, to 48%, at the expense of regimes of intermediate
degrees of flexibility.
As of April 1999 (Table 1), 37 countries (20% of all) share a common currency
through monetary union (including the EMU members and the CFA zone members) or
adoption of a foreign currency. Currency boards are observed in 8 countries only (like in
Argentina or Hong Kong) while fixed exchange rates are still prevalent in 44 countries.
Moving rates and various types of exchange rate bands are maintained in 23 countries. 25
countries adopt managed floats without a previously announced exchange rate target.
Almost twice that number – 48 countries – have in place an independently floating
exchange rate (many of them allowing for sporadic interventions without attempting to
influence the exchange rate in the medium term).
However the shift away from intermediate exchange rate systems and toward
extreme arrangements – in particular currency unions and free floats – is still far from
complete. For instance, both Chile and Colombia replaced their crawling bands by free
floats in September 1999. Ecuador announced in January 2000 that it would soon adopt4
unilaterally the US dollar. Argentina has been toiling for some time with the notion of
adopting the US dollar, too.
The Asian financial crisis and its repercussions in other regions, including Eastern
Europe and Latin America, accelerated giving up pegs or regimes of limited exchange rate
flexibility. Pegs provide inappropriate insurance against currency risk and often lead to
moral hazard, excessive short-term lending, and a terminal speculative attack that triggers
either a balance-of-payments crisis alone (as in Brazil 1998-99) or a full-blown twin crisis
where the latter is combined with a banking crisis (as in Indonesia 1998-99). 
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The worldwide shift toward extreme exchange arrangements and the state of the
debate as of today justify this paper’s focus on the two basic monetary regime options that
were described above. However, in reviewing the economic arguments and empirical
evidence that influence this choice one has to be aware that these extreme regimes are not
dominant yet (46% of countries in April 1999) and most of them are newcomers to the
extreme regimes. Thus, much of the empirical evidence comes from hybrid experiences that
cannot be termed clean floats or pure pegs. This has made Frankel (1999) claim that it is
too early to disregard hybrid regimes and that there is still no strong theoretical case against
regimes that keep the national currency with some bounded flexibility. But although this
position could still find some enthusiastic supporters in Chile – those arguing in favor of
using exchange rate policy to affect the level of the real exchange rate – the debate is
globally giving way to focusing more on the extreme choices.
Any decision on switching monetary/exchange rate regimes will have to depend on
both a cost-benefit analysis and on the political reality of the country in question. Focusing
on the former from both a macro and microeconomic perspective for the case of Chile is the
subject of section III below. Before that, some general considerations will be reviewed.
II.1  Credibility versus Flexibility
As some authors have argued (Frankel 1995, Edwards and Savastano 1999), the
regime choice involves a trade-off between credibility and flexibility. Floating allows a
country to pursue an independent monetary policy, enabling the national economy to
accommodate domestic and foreign shocks – changes in terms of trade, international
interest rates, and foreign financing – hence it delivers more flexibility. However, such
flexibility tends to be associated (on average), to higher inflation mostly because of a time-
consistency problem that brings less credibility to the anti-inflationary commitment of the
policy maker. Regarding the opposite regime, a credibly fixed exchange regime – and
hence even more a dollarized regime – has no flexibility stemming from monetary policy
and therefore lacks an instrument to deal with shocks but exhibits a firm commitment to
low inflation that makes this outcome more likely. Of course, this result depends on the
assumption that the foreign (or supranational) monetary authority is less prone to pursue
suboptimal monetary policies than the country deciding upon the regime choice.
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(1999).5
On this dimension a link can be made between this debate and the more general
discussion of rules versus discretion. Rule advocates would naturally side with the idea of
adopting a more stable foreign currency as a means to make clear that they do not believe
in the stabilizing properties of a local monetary authority. Examples of this position for the
case of Chile can be found in Rosende (1999). Two observations can be made on this
debate.
First, by adopting a foreign currency discretion does not disappear but rather is
shifted to a different (foreign or supranational) decision body. Whether or not the latter
authority will deliver more macro stability is debatable and country specific. Empirical
evidence comparing the record of countries with fixed and flexible exchange regimes is not
conclusive but tends to favor the former on inflationary accounts. On one side, in looking at
136 countries from 1960 to 1989, Ghosh et al. (1995) conclude that inflation is lower and
less volatile in fixed exchange rate countries. Edwards (1993), on the other side, calls
attention to the problem in distinguishing between well-behaved flexible regimes and those
that are forced off pegs and subsequently adopt floats under the duress of successful
speculative attacks (the survival bias). After controlling for the latter bias, the author finds
that pegging countries still show better inflation performance but that the result depends on
the particular country’s inflation history. But there are still two problems with these results.
First, the data on official regime classification in the IMF database is not necessarily
consistent with actual country practice. Second, there is potential selection bias (and reverse
causation) when a low-inflation country adopts a peg to signal its commitment to long-run
price stability.
The second observation is that a pure floating regime should not be uniquely
associated to discretion or the absence of rules. On the contrary, countries that have taken
seriously the flexibility/credibility trade-off (and hence the costs of high inflation) but have
in place a floating regime, have been looking for alternative monetary policy frameworks
that limit discretion. The best-known and increasingly more popular of these frameworks is
inflation targeting that, at least in industrial countries and emerging economies like Chile
and Israel, is proving to be an efficient framework for reducing inflation and attaining price
stability without giving up the national currency. A recent study compares the performance
of inflation targeters and non-targeters from 1985 to 1997 (all of them with their own
national currencies). Inflation targeters were shown to be able to reduce inflation by more
than 7% on average when comparing 1985-89 with 1993-97, which compares to a reduction
of ca. 3.5% in the case of non-targeters (Cecchetti and Ehrmann 1999).
In more general terms, and beyond inflation performance, how useful is it to have
an autonomous monetary policy? That is, how important is the closely related role of the
nominal exchange rate as a shock absorber? On the whole, shock absorption is more
relevant when shocks across countries considering a union (either à la EU or within a
dollarization scheme) are asymmetric, i.e. when the business cycles of partner countries are
asynchronic. In this case, a common monetary policy cannot serve stabilization in both
countries at the same time. This criterion, which is among the well-known optimal currency
area (OCA) requirements, is conceptually uncontroversial. However, there is controversy
on the empirical importance of this element. Evidence from industrial countries does show
that asymmetric shocks exist but they could be small (Bayoumi and Eichengreen 1992).6
Eichengreen (1998) enlarges the sample used in the preceding study by adding the
Mercosur countries. Results do not change much but shock asymmetry is less important for
the Mercosur countries than for the rest of the sample.
A possible explanation for the latter result could be that trade among Mercosur
countries has increased significantly, to a point where the likelihood of asymmetric shocks
to member countries has declined. This brings the issue as to whether a trade union should
precede a monetary union as an alternative to the view that a monetary union facilitates
trade and therefore should come simultaneously with the trade union.
II.2  Flexibility or Volatility ?
  The cross-country studies mentioned above for the case of inflation (like Edwards
1993, Ghosh et al. 1995, and Little, Corden, Cooper and Rajapatirana 1993), also show that
the exchange regime does not have a discernible effect on growth.
However, the nature of the data makes these results not very reliable for addressing
the question at hand. Much of the discussion so far has remained at a hypothetical level or
drawing from some casual observations on recent experiences. At a formal level, there has
been a growing literature looking at the optimality of each polar regime (including
Deveraux 1999, Zarazaga 1999, Jeanne and Rose 1999, and Obstfeld 1995). A striking
result of this literature is the policy implication derived from the accepted fact of high
volatility of exchange rates under floating, many times beyond fundamentals. On one side,
Obstfeld (1995) claims that it is not advisable to nominally anchor the economy on a price
(the exchange rate) which exhibits such a high volatility. As an asset price, the exchange
rate can show volatility for the same reasons asset prices do. The policy implication is that
the exchange rate should be allowed to float freely and hence policy makers should look for
a different and more stable anchor. In contrast, Jeanne and Rose (1999), among others,
draw exactly the opposite conclusion: high volatility of the exchange rate is bad for
resource allocation because it brings volatility to the real exchange rate and many other
relative prices beyond fundamentals, affecting growth. So the policy implication is to
abolish exchange rate volatility by giving up the national currency.
It is generally agreed that exchange rate volatility per se is harmful. But from here it
does not follow that a country should give up its currency and national monetary policy.
The question should rather be whether or not the market is able of delivering hedging
mechanisms that allow the private sector to live with a floating rate, paying a price that
does not exceed the benefits that society at large reaps by having a flexible exchange rate
and a monetary policy in place.
In a number of articles, Hausmann and co-authors have argued that in the case of
Latin America the balance is clearly against the floating cum hedging solution and that
exchange rate volatility is extremely harmful because it brings higher interest rates and
unstable policy reactions (Hausmann, Gavin, Pages-Serra, and Stein 1999, Hausmann and
Powell 1999). At the heart of the argument is the alleged inability of Latin American7
countries in creating a demand for financial instruments in their own currencies.
3 Thus, the
argument follows, hedging or derivatives markets would be either non-existent or too thin
to protect agents against exchange-rate volatility. The question, however, is whether the
only choice left is abandoning the local currency altogether. Doing so could be seen as a
shortcut to solve the fundamental problems lying beneath but that is not guaranteed. A good
example of this is the current Ecuadorian situation. And there could be countries that even
though they are original sinners could be so close to earthly redemption that the drastic
move towards giving up the local currency is at least dubious.
Yet volatility is the weak side of exchange rate flexibility. And flexibility is what
makes floating attractive. In essence, nominal flexibility of the exchange rate allows the
accommodation of different shocks that call for an adjustment in the real exchange rate. If a
country were to give up its national currency because it becomes a member of a monetary
union or adopts dollarization, then in assessing the move it will have to look at a number of
conditions that, if met, will reduce the costs of losing exchange rate flexibility. These
conditions are the OCA conditions, establishing that a very open and small economy with
wage and price flexibility, intense trade with its potential partners, a diversified industrial
production basis, an internationally diversified investment portfolio, and willing to accept
factor mobility between itself and its potential partners, is best qualified for monetary union
(Mundell 1962, McKinnon 1963).
Oddly enough, there exist just a handful of countries in the world that a priori
satisfy these OCA conditions. In a series of studies, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992, 1994,
1996, 1997) check these conditions for many industrial countries (most of Europe, the U.S.,
Japan, Australasia). What they found when considering Europe is that those countries that
are larger, with more asymmetric business cycles, and with highly specialized exports tend
to prefer more exchange rate flexibility, as opposed to those that trade more with each
other, which tend to favor more stable exchange rates. When taking into account Japan and
its trading partners (the US, Canada, Australasia, some of Europe and some other Asian
countries), results are virtually the same as in Europe, although the coefficient of export
composition is much smaller and not significantly different from zero. Eichengreen (1998)
consolidates the previous two samples with Mercosur countries and finds no substantial
changes, although in bilateral comparison among Mercosur members Brazil’s size vis a vis
its partners dominates any other consideration.
It is perhaps for these reasons that monetary unions beyond national frontiers have
been so infrequent in recent world experience. However there is an important issue of
endogeneity involved here. Indeed, if it is true that a monetary union promotes trade in
goods and financial capital between member countries, then this increased trade will
improve some of the OCA conditions. Larger trade in goods makes business cycles more
symmetric and shocks more alike in each member country, while the impact on product
diversification is ambiguous; more financial trade can help in portfolio diversification.
                                                          
3 Hausmann calls this the Latin American  “original sin”, which would  lie in the secular temptation of  Latin
American governments to default on their public debt expressed in local currencies by resorting to inflation.
This naturally discourages foreign investors to demand assets denominated in Latin American currencies
because of the high risk of capital losses.8
III.  EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE EXCHANGE RATE / MONETARY REGIMES
FOR CHILE
This section evaluates the desirability for Chile of maintaining the current
monetary/exchange rate regime or giving up its national currency. As discussed above, the
current regime is based on maintaining the national currency in a monetary framework
based on inflation targeting combined with a flexible exchange rate. The alternative to the
latter is giving up the peso, which can take either of two forms. One is “dollarization”
understood in this paper as unilateral adoption of a foreign currency. The other is monetary
union or multilaterally negotiated adoption of a common supranational currency with
fellow members of the union.
4 Most of the time, the distinction between both forms of
giving up the peso is immaterial to the analysis – however whenever it matters, it will be
considered.
It is also important to point out what this section does not do. First it does not
evaluate monetary and exchange rate regimes – as alternatives to giving up the peso – other
than Chile’s current combination of floating and inflation targeting. Second, it does not
provide an assessment of the optimal choice of which foreign currency (dollar, euro, or a
new supranational currency) should be adopted if the peso were given up.
This section reviews first the costs of giving up the peso, in comparison to
maintaining Chile’s national currency under the current policy framework. The latter costs
are smaller the better Chile satisfies the criteria of an optimal currency area (OCA) with
prospective currency partners. Hence the section focuses next on conventional and non-
conventional OCA criteria pointed out by the literature, providing – whenever feasible – a
quantitative assessment of their relevance for Chile. Then potential microeconomic benefits
of giving up the peso are reviewed for Chile. A final comparison of economic structures
and monetary system performance is drawn for four Southern Hemisphere countries with
different monetary systems in order to put Chile’s case in a broader perspective.
The subsequent cost-benefit evaluation and OCA criteria for Chile are made vis-a-
vis a number of prospective alternative partners for unilateral dollarization or multilateral
currency union. Five individual countries are considered here: the two main members of
Mercosur (Argentina and Brazil), two members of Nafta (Mexico and the United States; the
latter country is also of obvious importance for possible adoption of the US dollar), and
Germany and/or the European Union (for possible currency union or adoption of the euro).
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III.1  Costs of Giving up the Peso
Giving up the peso implies sacrificing benefits derived from having a national
currency. They are derived from three policy-making institutions or mechanisms that are
                                                          
4 There are additional intermediate forms like negotiated adoption of a foreign currency which for simplicity
we are not considering here.
5 Lack of long-term data series for particular trading blocks or currency unions – Mercosur, NAFTA, and the
European Union – forces to make use of time series of dominant individual countries.9
either abolished or drastically modified when giving up the peso: an independent monetary
and exchange rate policy, fiscal instruments dealing with country-specific shocks, and a
lender-of-last-resort function.
Independent monetary and exchange rate policy
Giving up the national currency abolishes national monetary policy (by transferring
monetary authority to a foreign central bank or a supranational monetary authority) and
abolishes the national nominal exchange rate. This involves incurring in four potential
costs.
Importing inflation. Giving up the national currency is often motivated by the
potential benefit of obtaining lower inflation. This was an important motivation of countries
with weaker currencies (i.e. higher inflation) in joining EMU, including Italy, Portugal, and
Greece. Importing low U.S. inflation is also a central motivation of Ecuador in pursuing
dollarization. In Chile, however, the institutional foundations – reflected in orthodox fiscal
and monetary policies and a well-regulated sound financial system – are laid to achieve
permanently low inflation, in the Central Bank’s target range of 2 to 4% per annum. Little
further inflation gains, if any, could be reaped from adopting a strong foreign currency like
the US dollar or the euro.
6 Moreover an inflation rate slightly above the OECD’s average
1.5-2% may be beneficial under conditions of high domestic growth and temporary price
rigidities.
7 Joining a regional supranational (say Mercosur) currency may risk obtaining
higher long-term inflation if the partners’ fiscal and financial institutions – or the
supranational monetary authority – are weaker than Chile’s.
Loss of exchange rate flexibility. Losing the nominal exchange rate as an instrument
of real exchange rate adjustment involves a cost of giving up the peso that rises with the
frequency and intensity of country-specific shocks and the extent of domestic price and
wage rigidities that preclude quick real exchange rate adjustment through domestic price
changes. In Chile, as reported below when assessing conventional OCA criteria, both
factors are very much present. Hence sacrificing nominal exchange rate flexibility can have
significant output, employment, and welfare costs.
Loss of stabilizing function of monetary policy. In a world where temporary nominal
price rigidities are important, the latter provide the key friction that gives rise to non-neutral
                                                          
6 A review of recent empirical studies on the costs of inflation (e.g. Sarel 1996, Andrés and Hernando 1997,
Groshen and Schweitzer 1997) show that significant net growth and welfare benefits can be reaped when
reducing inflation to 5% but there is no clear evidence of further gains when lowering inflation below the
latter level. A different view is held by Feldstein (1996) who argues that for the U.S. even a 2% inflation rate
imposes a significant welfare loss.
7 The reason is that under high domestic growth, the difference between the domestic and foreign traded non-
traded productivity growth differential is positive, leading to real exchange rate appreciation. This Balassa-
Harrod-Samuelson trend appreciation has been estimated at 0.7% per anum for Chile during the 1990s
(Délano and Valdés 1998).With an OECD level of inflation rate at 1.5%, real appreciation requires lower
average absolute inflation of traded goods (and a larger share of traded goods with absolute deflation) in Chile
than in OECD countries. This may be costly under conditions of temporary price rigidities that are likely to be
prevalent in Chile.10
effects of monetary policy.
8 While accepting the latter as a key stylized facts in modern
economies, it is still open to questioning if monetary policy in any given country is
conducted in a way such that it contributes to society’s and the central bank’s objective of
output and inflation stabilization over the business cycle. Evaluation of the historical
contribution of monetary policy to stabilization in Chile is beyond the scope of this paper –
and there is scant empirical literature on this subject.
9 Moreover it can be argued that the
historical performance offers little guidance to the current and expected future performance
of the Central Bank’s contribution to stabilization. The reason is the massive structural
change that is taking place in 1999-2000 regarding the policy framework and inflation
performance. These changes – adoption of a floating exchange rate, improvement in the
inflation targeting framework, and convergence to stationary low inflation – all contribute
to a better conduct of monetary policy that translates into a structural improvement in future
business cycle stabilization. Giving up this function by yielding monetary policy to a
foreign or supranational authority is likely to be costly in a country where temporary
nominal price rigidities and asymmetric shocks are intense, as argued below.
Loss of seignorage. With declining worldwide inflation, seignorage has shrunk from
a traditional international average of 1.0% (2.1%) of GDP in industrial (developing)
countries 
10 to only a fraction of 1% of GDP. This beneficial decline in seignorage revenue
– to a large extent stemming from lower inflation tax collection – has been the result of
successful worldwide stabilization during the 1990s. Additional extensive seignorage loss
can be anticipated in the future due to growing substitution of electronic money for
currency.
11 In the six countries under consideration, estimates of recent seignorage
(calculated as the growth of currency over GDP, in order to make international comparison
easier) are very low. They range from 0.15% of GDP per annum in Germany to 0.55% in
Mexico (Table 2). Chile’s seignorage stood at an average 0.25% of GDP during 1995-1998.
A currency union requires a seignorage sharing agreement among participating
members, as exemplified by EMU. Unilateral adoption of a foreign currency is costly if it
precludes such an agreement, e.g. Panama has yielded – and Ecuador is likely to do so in
the near future – its seignorage revenue to the U.S. This cost of unilateral dollarization can
be estimated as the sum of two components: an initial public-sector cost derived from the
need of purchasing all national currency in the economy and the properly called seignorage
cost, i.e. the revenue lost to the issuer of foreign currency, that depends on the stock of
currency and GDP growth in the dollarized country and on US inflation.
                                                          
8 Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999) review recent theoretical foundations and empirical findings on the conduct
and results of monetary policy under nominal price rigidities and rational expectations. This approach stands
in contrast to other strands of the literature that tend to reject the the idea of nominal price rigidites (e.g. real
business cycle theory) or focus on other rigidities (such as frictions in money demand).
9 Cabrera and Lagos (1999) find that in Chile there is no clear response of production and aggregate demand
to changes in the interest rate, although they are affected by the money stock. Cecchetti and Ehrmann (1999)
find that countries with inflation targets have higher output volatility and lower inflation volatility than non-
targeters. Medina and Valdés (2000) analize for Chile the effect on monetary policy of adopting an inflation
range target (instead of a point target) and how this affects the output gap.
10 These figures are long-term (1965-1989) averages for 15 industrial and 35 developing countries, as
estimated by Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel (1994).
11 Budnevich and Lehmann (1999) analyze the likely effects of introducing electronic money on currency
substitution and seigniorage in Chile.11
For Chile the initial cost is estimated at 2.6% of GDP and the annual seignorage loss
is calculated at 0.19% of GDP (with national GDP growth of 5% and U.S. inflation of
2.5%; see Table 2). At a 7.5% discount rate, the latter annual flow is the equivalent of a
once-and for-all transfer of 2.5% of GDP to the foreign country. Among the three other
Latin American countries, Brazil would incur in the lowest seignorage sacrifice, a result of
having the lowest currency stock over GDP and facing lower growth prospects than Chile.
This seignorage transfer, incurred under unilateral dollarization but not under a negotiated
currency union, may be economically and politically unacceptable to most countries.
Fiscal coordination and intra-regional fiscal transfers
Regional coordination of fiscal policies among members of a currency union is
highly desirable to take account of macroeconomic spillovers associated with stabilization
policy and externalities related to budget discipline and monetary policy credibility. A
separate issue, however, is how to deal with country or region-specific shocks within a
currency union. In the absence of high degrees of labor mobility, wage and price flexibility,
symmetry of foreign shocks and domestic business cycles, and production and income
diversification, adoption of a fiscal instrument is especially important to cushion a region or
a country from specific or asymmetric shocks.
Most countries in the world have developed a system of intra-country regional
transfers based on taxes and transfers, administered by the central fiscal authority and
enshrined in legislation. In Canada and the U.S., for instance, the federal tax and transfer
systems serve as important shock absorbers to deal with province or state-specific shocks
(Bayoumi and Masson 1991, Sachs and Sala-i-Martin 1992). However in the case of EMU
and the EU, the central community budget is still very small in comparison to national
budgets. For instance, it is estimated that only 1% of an income loss from an adverse shock
hitting any member country was compensated by EU community taxes before adoption of
the euro in 1999. However this is changing somewhat with the increase in structural funds
approved for the central EU budget (Masson and Taylor 1993).
Joining a currency union requires developing a system of intra-regional transfers,
particularly in the absence of strong labor mobility, significant price and wage inflexibility,
strongly asymmetric shocks, and high production and income concentration, as in the case
of Chile. Unilateral adoption of a foreign currency without a system of international fiscal
transfers would be costly in this regard.
Lender of last resort
Historically and still today in most countries, the existence of a currency-issuing
monetary authority has been linked to its role as a lender of last resort for the national
financial system. While this dual role of a central bank has a historical rationale, it is not
necessary to be maintained in this fashion. In the case of EMU, there is no central lender of
last resort, a feature that could become a significant potential weakness. Currently the
Central Bank of Chile provides free (but limited) explicit insurance to deposits of domestic
banks.12
More recently, market-based arrangements are starting to replace the central bank’s
or government’s role of lender of last resort. Argentina’s pioneering experience with
contingent credit lines that domestic banks are required to open with foreign banks is very
promising (Gavin and Powell 1998). Further arrangements along these lines that transfer
costly explicit or implicit insurance and lender-of-last-resort guarantees – that lead to moral
hazard behavior – from central banks to markets are likely to spread worldwide. In
addition, opening up domestic financial markets to participation by subsidiaries of large
international financial institutions contributes to transferring lender-of-last-resort functions
from domestic central banks to foreign main offices.
Independently of these welcome developments, adoption of a foreign currency
would require a clear redefinition of lender-of-last-resort functions and institutions.
Moreover it should include adoption of a banking regulatory and supervisory framework
that is similar to those adopted in other currency partners in order to minimize asymmetric
exposure to moral-hazard behavior and financial crises among currency area members.
III.2  Conventional OCA Criteria
As pointed out by 1999 Nobel laureate Robert Mundell in his classical article
(Mundell 1961), there are factors related to macroeconomic shocks that constrain the size
of an OCA – and hence the desirability for any country to join prospective partners in a
currency union. In the absence of full instantaneous wage and price flexibility, fast real
exchange rate depreciation can only be accomplished through quick nominal depreciation.
In the absence of full wage/price flexibility and full factor mobility between union
members, asymmetric shocks will lead to unemployment. This opens room for a stabilizing
role of monetary policy. Hence traditional criteria to evaluate optimality of a currency
union comprise the extent of factor mobility and market flexibility, trade openness and
regional interdependence, symmetry of external shocks and business cycles, and output and
portfolio diversification.
Income and Inflation
Comparison of income levels, growth performance, and inflation records provides a
useful starting point (Table 3). Chile’s current development level – reflected by two
alternative per capita income measures – is similar to that of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico.
A large gap separates the four Latin American economies from the U.S. and Germany, who
exhibit per capita income levels that are 2 to 7 times those of the four Latin American
economies. Per capita income in the U.S. is 6.5 times that of Chile. These are large
differences in comparison to intra-European income differentials. For example, Germany’s
per capita GDP is 2.6 times that of Portugal, the poorest EMU member (Levy-Yevati and
Sturzenegger 1999).
Regarding the closure of income gaps, Chile has been the most successful among
the four Latin American countries, growing at a rate of 7.5% during 1986-1998, more than
twice the growth rate of the other three Latin American countries. After its 1999 recession –
the first in 15 years – Chile’s growth is projected to rebound in 2000-2001.13
Regarding inflation, the overall historical 1986-98 performance of the four Latin
American countries ranged from mediocre to dismal, in comparison to that of industrial
countries. However in the 1990s Argentina and Brazil successfully stopped their protracted
hyperinflations. Argentina, which adopted a currency board in 1991 pegging its peso to the
US dollar, has been particularly successful in defeating inflation. The country exhibited
deflation from 1997 to 1999 and is projected to maintain almost absolute price stability in
the near future. Brazil, after a small inflationary rebound in the aftermath of its exchange
rate crisis in early 1999, has maintained single-digit inflation and is committed to gradually
attain low inflation under floating cum inflation targeting. Mexico, with a floating regime
adopted in the aftermath of the Tequila crisis and a gradually strengthened inflation-
targeting regime, is also converging gradually to single-digit inflation. Chile attained in
1999 an inflation of 2.3%, well below its 1999 inflation point target, but consistent with its
2-4% target range announced for the medium term.
Factor Mobility and International Correlations
Labor mobility is low across countries, not only between industrial and developing
economies but also between developing economies. Legal restrictions and cultural barriers
inhibit labor mobility between Argentina and Chile – or even between Mercosur members
Argentina and Brazil – although there are substantial international differences in dollar
wages and employment opportunities at any point in time. In fact unemployment rates
differ both historically and today between Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico – and, for
that matter also between the latter countries and the U.S. and the European Union (Table 4).
Mexico’s 3.8% and Brazil’s 5.5% average (1986-98) unemployment rates are below
Chile’s 7.2% and Argentina’s 11.7%, and even below the U.S.’ 6% and Germany’s 11.2%.
Current (1999) unemployment rates show a similar dispersion. Moreover, historical (1986-
97) unemployment correlation coefficients
12 between Chile and Argentina, Brazil, Mexico,
and Germany are large, negative, and significantly different from zero. The one
unemployment correlation coefficient that is positive (at 0.47) and significant for Chile is
with the U.S. However, when using a sample of quarterly data starting in 1993, the
unemployment correlation between Chile and United States becomes negative, but non-
significant.
As opposed to international labor mobility, worldwide mobility of financial capital
is already large but still increasing. Gross flows of financial capital are increasing
worldwide and for the countries considered here in particular – a result of growing
attractiveness of emerging markets to international investors, technical progress in
communications and capital mobility, and the dismantling of capital flow restrictions in
most emerging economies. Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico have eliminated most or all of
their capital restrictions during the 1990s. Chile has eliminated all restrictions on capital
outflows and most restrictions on inflows during the 1990s.
13 
14
                                                          
12 In all tables, statistically significant (non-significant) correlation coefficients are reported in bold (normal)
type.
13 Gallego, Hernández, and Schmidt-Hebbel (1999) document the relaxation of various categories of capital
flow restrictions in Chile during the 1990s and their effects on key macroeconomic and financial variables.
14 A capital account liberalization index for 1995 (Morley et al. 1998) shows Chile with a relatively restricted
capital account (Table 12), if compared to Argentina (the regional leader) and Mexico. Brazil shows the
poorest record among all Latin American countries. However, this index does not accurately reflect current14
Yet large differences in interest rates and stock market returns persist across
countries (Table 4).The average short-term real bank deposit rate in Chile – at 6.3% per
annum during the last 14 years – is more than twice the average rate in the U.S. and
Germany. Within Latin America, this real bank deposit rates show major differences.
Excluding periods of hyperinflation and adjustment, Brazil has had an average 1995-1999
rate of 17.7%, Argentina an average 6.2% rate (1993-1999), and Mexico very low average
rate of 0.14% (since 1992).
Another way to assess financial integration between Chile and prospective partners
is checking for the contemporaneous correlation between Chile’s and the partners’ interest
rates.
15 Among the 5 correlation coefficients, only those for Chile and Brazil and for Chile
and Mexico are significant. The correlation with Brazil is consistently positive, significant,
and moderately large, although it has declined during the 1990s in comparison to the 1980s.
The correlation with Mexico is positive and moderately large during the full 1986-1999
sample period but it has become significantly negative during the 1990s. Correlations with
the other three countries are non-significant and close to zero.
Average stock market real returns also display considerable difference across
countries during the 1990s. The correlation between Chile’s stock market returns and those
of other countries is somewhat larger than that of real interest rates. There is a consistently
positive and significant correlation with Argentina and even larger positive correlations are
observed with Brazil and Mexico during the last five years. There is no clear consistently
significant correlation with the industrialized countries, although an exceptional positive
and significant correlation was observed with the U.S. during the early 1990s. Larger
international financial integration by and significant international financial contagion in
emerging economies is likely behind the large stock market return correlations for Chile
with Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico during the last six years. However Chile’s zero
correlation with U.S. and German stock market returns is still puzzling.
Mobility of physical capital is far more limited than that of financial capital. As first
pointed out by Feldstein and Horioka (1980), the high correlation between saving and
investment observed for most countries in the world can be interpreted as a puzzling lack of
international capital mobility. The correlations between national saving and gross domestic
investment rates for Chile and other countries generally confirm this result (Table 4), with a
strong positive link between the two variables which, in the case of Chile and Germany, is
close to 1 for the full 1970-1994 sample period. At shorter periods, Chile exhibits a
negative saving-investment correlation during the 1970s and a very large positive
correlation since 1980. Most other countries tend to confirm the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle
at shorter periods, with the surprising exception of Argentina and Mexico since 1980.
In sum, labor mobility between Chile and prospective currency partners is close to
zero, now and for the foreseeable future. Labor unemployment levels differ across the 6
                                                                                                                                                                                
international financial integration as many of these countries – and Chile in particular – have recorded much
progress in further liberalization after 1995.15
countries. Chile’s unemployment correlation seems to be negative with most other
countries. Although is a positive unemployment correlation with the U.S. using annual
data, it becomes negative (but remains non-significant) when using quarterly observations.
International financial integration has increased worldwide during the 1990s and so it has in
Chile. Yet large differences in the levels of interest rates and stock market returns between
Chile and prospective partners persist to date. Moreover, correlations of interest rates
between Chile are zero (with 3 countries) and when they were positive and significant in
the 1980s they declined in the 1990s (with 2 countries). Correlations of stock market
returns are positive and significant with the three Latin American countries but zero with
the U.S. and Germany during the last 5 years. Chile’s low degree of physical capital
integration is reflected by a very high 0.94 saving-investment correlation observed since the
early 1980s.
Wage and Price Flexibility
Wage flexibility is largely determined by labor market regulations and rigidities. An
estimate of the degree of labor market liberalization puts Chile ahead of Argentina, Brazil,
and Mexico and behind countries like Jamaica and Peru (Table 5).
A measure of wage flexibility is the correlation between real wages and the business
cycle. If wages were largely flexible, one would expect a procyclical behavior of wages, i.e.
a positive correlation between the real wage and the business cycle. This is indeed the case
in 4 of the 6 countries during the 1990s, since only Argentina and Chile display a non-
significant correlation between the trend deviation of real wages and the trend deviation of
GDP. In the case of Chile wages had displayed a significantly procyclical behavior during
the 1986-1991 period but it vanished during 1992-1998. This may reflect the high degree of
indexation established in Chilean contracts, as well as the strong influence on aggregate
wages of public-sector wages and statutory minimum wages – both of which are largely
insensitive to the business cycle.
Not only wages but also prices of services and non-traded goods at large are highly
indexed to past inflation in Chile. In fact, Chile is likely to be the most indexed economy in
the world to date.
16 Our own subjective ranking of the extent of price indexation puts Chile
clearly at the upper end among the six countries (Table 5). Argentina and Brazil eliminated
indexation at the start of their stabilization programs in the early 1990s but informal
indexation still exists in Brazil. In Mexico indexation seems to be low, as in the U.S. as
well. In Germany it is more widespread.
Trade Openness and International Interdependence
Chile and Mexico are the most open economies among the six countries considered,
as measured by the shares of trade (exports and imports) in GDP (Table 6). As measured by
average import tariff rates, Chile was only slightly more open than Argentina, Brazil, and
Mexico in 1998, with an 11% almost flat statutory tariff rate on imports. However that
tariff rate was approximately twice the average rate prevailing in the U.S. and Germany.
                                                          
16 Take, for instance, Chile’s still widely used “Unidad de Fomento” (UF), which according to Shiller (1997)
was the first indexed unit of account in the world. For a historical description of indexation in Chile and its
relation to inflation and the real exchange rate across countries see Landerretche and Valdés (1998).16
Since then, tariff rates are declining further in Chile, as a result of continuing unilateral
trade liberalization that will bring down the statutory tariff rate to 6% in January 2003.
17
Hence Chile’s integration into world markets is already high but yet rising.
Chile’s major regional trading partners are East Asia, the European Union, Nafta,
and Latin America and the Caribbean. The share of Chile’s trade with the European Union
amounts to 25% of total trade, and the corresponding figures with the U.S. and with Nafta
are 20% and 24%. The shares with Argentina, Brazil, and Mercosur at large are 8%, 6%,
and 15%, respectively. Hence Chile’s trade integration with its prospective currency
partners ranges from small to moderately large.
Symmetry of External Shocks and Business Cycles
Chile, as well as other Latin American countries, is subject to large volatility in its
terms of trade (TT), typically well above the variation of TT observed in industrial
economies (Table 7). Indeed, Chile and Mexico show the largest terms-of-trade fluctuations
among the six countries.
18
How symmetric are the terms-of-trade shocks that hit Chile regarding those
affecting its prospective partners? The answer depends on the period under consideration.
For the whole 1960-1995 period, the TT correlations between Chile and Argentina, Brazil,
and the U.S. range from moderate to very high. However these results are influenced by
large positive correlations observed during 1960-1979. The pattern of correlations changed
significantly during the last two decades (1980-1995 in the available sample), ranging from
moderately positive to significantly negative correlations. This result is relatively robust to
the two alternative TT measures available for Chile. 1980-1995 correlations of Chile’s TT
vary from nil to low and positive with the TT of Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Germany,
with correlation coefficients that range from zero to 0.33. With the U.S., however, Chile’s
TT correlation is negative, moderately large, and significant since 1980 (-0.49 and -0.44,
depending on the series used). Hence Chile is exposed to international price shocks that are
of opposite sign to those affecting the U.S.
How symmetric is Chile’s business cycle compared to that in prospective partner
countries? This question will be analyzed by checking at the evidence from different
angles. First, business cycle correlations can be analyzed by making use of alternative
output measures. Here the focus will be on correlations between GDP growth rates (Table
8) and between deviations from trend GDP levels (Table 9). Second, different data
frequencies will be used, including quarterly data (upper panels of Tables 8 and 9) and
annual data (lower panels of Tables 8 and 9). Third, lagged correlations will be reported in
                                                          
17 The average tariff rate is lower than the statutory rate because of special regimes depending on country of
origin and product category. Chile has entered into a growing number of multilateral and bilateral trade
agreements with countries and trading blocs, that involve phased reductions in tariff rates toward zero for
most involved countries and products. On the other side, however, price bands and trade safeguards with high
implicit tariffs are applied to a growing number of farm products and other imports that compete with
domestic production.
18 Using an alternative World Bank series (TT2), Chile shows the lowest variability among the non-
industrialized countries.17
addition to contemporaneous correlations.
19 Indeed, lagged correlations may be larger than
contemporaneous correlations in the case of quantity variables – such as output or
consumption – subject to international transmission and delayed reactions.
20 Hence
correlations at lags 1 and 2 – for Chile’s variables in comparison to those of prospective
partners – are reported below.
The variety of results on business cycle correlations reported in both tables suggests
lack of robustness in some dimensions. The most robust result is for annual correlations for
the full 1980-1998 period based on both GDP measures (lower panels of Tables 8 and 9).
They are mostly positive and significant for each of the five countries, ranging from 0.20
(Argentina, GDP growth, contemporaneous) to 0.61 (Brazil, GDP growth, 2 lags).
21
However when considering quarterly observations or shorter sample periods (the 1980s
separately from the 1990s) this common pattern of positive correlations fades away.
Chile’s business cycle correlations with Argentina are not robust across different
GDP measures, sample periods, and frequencies. Focusing only on quarterly observations –
which tend to be more reliable for shorter samples than annual observations – one notes
that the correlations with Argentina tend to change sign, from positive during 1986-1991 to
negative during 1992-1998. This is particularly surprising when considering that the change
in business cycle correlations takes place in the 1990s, a period of significant unilateral and
bilateral trade and financial opening by both Argentina and Chile, reflected in a major
increase in their bilateral trade and capital flows.
In the case of Chile’s correlations with Brazil, no clear general pattern emerges. The
exception is for the 6 quarterly observations at 2 lags, that are all moderately positive and
significant, ranging from 0.21 to 0.34.
Mexico’s correlations with Chile are also generally unstable. However most
correlations for the 1990s (including all quarterly correlations for 1992-1998) are negative
and significant, ranging from –0.18 to –0.48.
Business cycle correlations between Chile and the U.S. also tend to show a major
shift in magnitude and sign during the 1990s. Using annual data, the correlations fall from a
range of 0.43/0.68 in the 1980s to a range of –0.60/0.09 in the 1990s. The more reliable
quarterly correlations tend to confirm this change. Indeed, Chile’s quarterly GDP
correlations with the U.S. range from –0.22 to –0.48 during 1992-1998.
Regarding Germany, Chile’s GDP correlations with Germany tend to be positive
and significant but there are two many exceptions to establish a clear pattern across
different measures and sample periods.
                                                          
19 Only significant correlations at lags 1 and 2 are reported in Tables 8-10.
20 Instantaneous arbitrage in world commodity and financial markets suggest to focus only on
contemporaneous correlations in the case of interest rates, stock market retiurns, and terms of trade, as was
done above.
21 The only exception is Mexico, with a negative significant correlation with GDP growth and 1 lag.18
In sum, Chile’s business cycle is asynchronic with the business cycles in
prospective partner countries. Only when using annual observations for the full 1980-1998
historical sample, correlations with each of the 5 countries are positive. This result is
strongly determined by positive co-movements observed during the 1980s, which were
likely caused by the second oil crisis, the U.S. monetary crunch, the Latin debt crisis, and
the world recession and subsequent recovery. In contrast, when comparing Chile’s
international business cycle correlations in the 1980s with those during the 1990s, they
often turn from positive to negative. Most of Chile’s quarterly GDP correlations with
Argentina, Mexico, and the U.S. are negative and significant during the 1990s. Hence Chile
fails this classical OCA criteria.
Similar correlations for real private consumption growth rates and deviations from
trend, based on annual data, are calculated for Chile and the 5 countries (Table 10).
22 Due
to the lack of robustness across different sub-samples and consumption measures, only the
results on the full 1980-1998 period are briefly discussed next.
Chile’s consumption correlations with Argentina are positive and range from 0.18 to
0.52, exceeding comparable GDP correlations. Consumption correlations with Brazil are
zero. Correlations with Mexico are positive and significant, ranging from 0.26 to 0.42.
Chile’s consumption correlation with the U.S. are moderately negative (-0.21 to -0.22) but
not significant. The largest consumption correlations are those with Germany, ranging from
0.31 to 0.69.
It is useful to put the results reported here in a broader perspective of recent
empirical studies on cross-country comovements. Loayza, López, and Ubide (1999) use an
error-components model to study GDP growth comovements between different countries of
Europe, Asia, and Latin America. They find significant comovement between Chile and
Brazil while Chile does not exhibit significant comovement with Mexico. However the
results suggest that business cycles in Latin American countries are not mainly influenced
by regional forces but mostly by country-specific factors and shocks that originate in other
areas like Europe or the U.S. The low levels of comovement within Latin America differ
from the strong links found within Europe or Asia.
Licandro Ferrando (1998) compares similarities of supply shocks affecting
Mercosur to those affecting NAFTA and EMU. There seems to be more asymmetry in
Mercosur than in the other two blocks. Levy-Yevati and Sturzenegger (1999) refer to
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) and Kenen (1995) which show that shocks affecting
Mercosur are larger than those affecting NAFTA and EMU. Licandro Ferrando also finds
increasing symmetry within Mercosur during the last years as trade integration has
increased. Although Chile is not a Mercosur member and hence was not included in the
previous sample, one should note that the latter result runs counter to the findings of this
paper that show that Chile’s business cycle got more desynchronized with Argentina’s
during the 1990s.
                                                          
22 No quarterly 1980-1998 consumption data are available for any of the 4 Latin American countries.19
Output and Portfolio Diversification
Country specialization in production, exports, and asset portfolios makes a currency
union less attractive. Chile’s production and exports are indeed highly concentrated in
natural resources and manufacturing based on commodities. The country’s share of
agriculture and mining in GDP is 16%, significantly higher than Argentina’s 10% share and
twice the shares in Brazil and Mexico (Table11). The same result holds for the share of
total exports, where primary products represent a huge 85% in Chile – a figure that is much
larger than comparable shares in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico.
International diversification of asset portfolios held by Chilean residents is still low
but growing. Foreign direct investment flows by Chileans abroad (particularly toward
neighboring countries) is rising and so is the share of Chile’s private pension assets that are
held abroad. The latter have attained 14% of total pension assets or 7% of GDP in late 1999
– a much larger figure than the shares invested abroad by private pension funds of other
Latin American countries(Table 11). However Chile has still there a long way to go before
attaining well-diversified portfolio holdings by its residents, requiring large future gross
capital flows in both directions.
Final remark
A final but important point related to OCA criteria requires to be addressed. The
conditions on which evaluation of OCA criteria are based are not static. They not only do
change over time (as illustrated by the change of GDP correlations reported above) but are
also likely to be affected by changes in monetary regime. In fact, it is often argued that
wage and price flexibility, trade openness, international integration, and portfolio
diversification could increase after adopting a foreign currency (Masson and Taylor 1993).
Indeed this is expected to occur under EMU – although there, as elsewhere, it is hard to
disentangle the contribution of monetary union from the effects of all other dimensions of
European economic and political union.
Yet there is one dimension that may evolve in the opposite direction as a result of
giving up the peso. As a result of the microeconomic benefits to trade and integration
derived from adopting a foreign currency (discussed below), it is likely for output
specialization to increase. Chile is already quite specialized and open, but further trade and
integration are likely to occur if microeconomic gains of adopting a foreign or common
currency are reaped. However more output specialization intensifies the consequences of
country-specific foreign shocks and domestic output shocks, reducing the comovements (or
raising asynchronization) of the business cycle in Chile and that of its prospective currency
partners.
III.3  Non-Conventional Criteria
In addition to the traditional criteria derived from Mundell’s classical OCA
arguments, a number of non-conventional economic and institutional features bear on the
choice of a currency regime. The importance of showing progress in these dimensions
before initiating monetary union has been clearly demonstrated in the case of EMU.20
Overall progress in structural reform
Attaining an advanced stage of progress toward market liberalization and structural
reform is desirable before adoption of a foreign currency. Deregulated domestic markets
and an open economy to international trade and capital flows raise the microeconomic
benefits and may lower the macroeconomic costs of monetary integration. The EMU
experience is a case in point: significant progress in structural reform – and, moreover, in
full factor market integration – was achieved before adoption of the euro. Close
coordination on domestic regulations and supervision of labor and financial markets – or
preferably adoption of common laws and regulations governing factor markets – is highly
desirable before adopting a common currency.
Chile’s overall structural reform indicator for 1995 is similar to that of prospective
partners Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico (Table 12). This leaves all of them relatively
advanced for adopting a foreign currency.
Fiscal stance
A sound fiscal and monetary stance is a prerequisite for smooth adoption of a
foreign currency. In particular domestic fiscal policy has to be strengthened in a currency
union in order to maximize monetary policy credibility and preclude bailing out of weak
fiscal members by their stronger partners or – even worse – by the regional central bank.
Achieving stronger fiscal positions in all prospective EMU member countries before their
joining of monetary union was the purpose of the Maastricht prerequisites on fiscal
position, inflation, and interest rates. They involved four ceilings: a government budget
deficit of 3% of GDP, an overall government debt of 60% of GDP, inflation of 1.5% above
the average of the 3 countries with lowest inflation rates, and a long-term nominal interest
rate of 2% above the average of the 3 countries with lowest inflation.
Do Chile and its prospective partners satisfy the Maastricht criteria? Chile satisfies
three prerequisites, with low inflation, budget deficit, and government debt. (Tables 3 and
12). Only the current interest rate is higher in Chile than the Maastricht ceiling – but it is
lower than in all other Latin American countries. Obviously, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico
do not meet the Maastricht criteria on interest rates. In addition Brazil fails to accomplish
Maastricht criteria regarding inflation and the budget deficit, while Mexico exceeds the
inflation ceiling.
Monetary union as part of a larger process of overall economic and political union
It is hard to disentangle if EMU’s success – and by how much – is due to monetary
union itself or to the preceding process of overall economic (and political) European
integration in goods, factor, and asset markets. In addition, European union members had
reformed domestic legislation and regulation of the latter markets in a coordinated way
since the 1980s. Coordinated structural reform of domestic goods, factor, and asset markets
and their full integration across the union reduces the likelihood of asymmetric shocks and,
when they occur, ensures that they will be less costly. Hence macroeconomic costs of
currency union are reduced and microeconomic benefits are enhanced by overall economic
integration.21
Chile, vis-a-vis prospective currency partners, stands far away from the EMU model
of overall economic and currency union. Abstracting from meeting narrow fiscal and
financial (Maastricht) criteria, domestic legislation and regulation governing all relevant
markets is very different in Chile from that in Mercosur countries, or in Mexico, the U.S. or
the EU. Whichever prospective currency partners Chile may consider, the country would
have to go a long way of overall economic (and political) union, of which monetary union
would come at a relatively late stage. Unilateral adoption of a foreign currency would have
the disadvantage of not allowing such coordinated economic union to take place.
III.4  Benefits of Giving up the Peso
The benefits of giving up the national currency are microeconomic in nature. We
review four potential benefits in the context of Chile.
Lower foreign-currency transaction costs
Giving up the national currency eliminates the need for currency conversion and
reduces corresponding international trade and financial transaction costs when trading with
the country or monetary union members whose currency has been adopted and with those
other countries with whom transactions are conducted in the adopted currency. For the case
of EMU, transaction cost savings from adopting the euro were estimated, as mentioned
before, at 0.4% of GDP per year for the average union member (Emerson et al. 1992).
Larger benefits accrue to smaller European countries with less developed financial systems,
higher initial foreign-currency transaction costs, and larger trade shares with other EMU
members. For New Zealand, a hypothetical currency union with Australia is estimated to
bring about transaction savings of 0.13% per year (Hargreaves 1999).
Chile’s financial system is relatively developed and foreign-currency transaction
costs are relatively small in international comparison and particularly compared to the
average European country before adoption of the euro. On the other side, unilateral
adoption of the U.S. dollar would cover a much larger share of foreign transactions –
roughly 90% of Chile’s foreign transactions are conducted in US dollars, compared to only
14% of EU trade conducted as intra-EU trade. Adoption of a common currency with
Mercosur would provide much smaller transaction savings, considering the low share of
Chile’s transactions with Mercosur countries, equivalent to 15% of Chile’s total trade.
In the absence of a detailed calculation based on foreign-currency transaction flows
and margin transaction costs for Chile, we estimate that the benchmark EMU transaction
savings of 0.4% of GDP is an appropriate upper bound of this benefit for Chile in the event
of adoption of the US$. The corresponding upper bound estimate for a currency union with
Mercosur is 0.07% of GDP transaction cost savings.
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23 The latter figure is the product of the transaction cost savings of adopting the US dollar (0.4%) and the
authors’ estimate of the ratio of Chile’s transactions in Mercosur currency relative to transactions in US
dollars (17.5%).22
Less market segmentation and larger goods market integration
Maintaining a national currency may better allow forms to discriminate prices in
different countries separated by different monies. Arbitrage through international trade may
be obscured by quotations in different currencies at rates that fluctuate a lot.
An additional related cost of a national currency stems from home bias on the
demand side: people and firms tend to spend relatively more on nationally produced goods
and services, after controlling for other demand determinants. International evidence
suggests that national spending displays some home bias (McCallum 1996, Wei 1996,
Helliwell 1998).
It is very hard – for two reasons – to quantify the benefits of giving up the currency
that arise from lower price discrimination on the supply side and lower home bias on the
demand side. First, imperfect competition among suppliers and cultural barriers on the
demand side are likely to be much more important than the currency veil in causing price
discrimination between countries and home bias, respectively. Second, it is difficult to
isolate the gains due to adoption of a foreign currency and the gains that arise from
simultaneous trade, financial, and political integration and reforms that parallel currency
union or unilateral adoption of a foreign currency. These difficulties are not made easier for
the Chilean case, which lacks any study on these subjects.
Larger international trade from lower exchange rate risk
The elimination of exchange rate risk when adopting a foreign currency is beneficial
to exporters and importers – and to producers and consumers of traded goods at large. The
international evidence shows that (i) exchange rate volatility is higher in more flexible
exchange rate systems, and (ii) an important part of real exchange rate volatility is due to
fluctuations in nominal exchange rates (Taylor, 1995). On the other hand, exchange rate
fluctuations that occur in response to terms of trade shocks reduce domestic price volatility
(Hargreaves 1999). This is precisely one of the macro benefits of maintaining a national
currency: the desired exchange-rate response to a foreign shock. On balance, however, it is
likely that exchange rate volatility does more harm than good to traded-goods activities.
How costly is exchange rate volatility for trade? International evidence on the
impact of exchange rate volatility on exports ranges from inconclusive (IMF 1984) to small
but statistically significant negative effects (Dell’ Ariccia 1998). Caballero and Corbo
(1988) find, for several least developed countries, a strong negative effect of real exchange
uncertainty on export performance.
 Modern financial markets provide some hedges against exchange rate risk in the
form of forward contracts and options. While there is a strong development of these
markets, both internationally and in Chile, there is still a long way to go before reaching a
stage where a deep market of exchange forwards and options offers an array of products
covering all horizons and customer needs. In the meantime, currency risk can and is
certainly not diversified away yet, and hence is likely to affect negatively Chile’s
international trade and trade-related activities.23
Elimination of exchange rate risk premium
The second exchange rate risk-related benefit of giving up the local currency is
elimination of the exchange rate premium. In the case of Chile, this premium on annual
maturities ranges currently from 0.57% to 3.7% per year (see below). When preserving the
national currency, domestic interest rates are increased by the amount of the risk premium.
A higher cost of capital lowers investment and growth. It also distorts portfolio allocation
(between domestic and foreign assets) and intertemporal consumption decisions, reducing
consumer welfare further. Estimation of these output and welfare costs for Chile is not easy
because they are model-specific and exchange-rate premiums are volatile. Hence there is
fertile ground for future research on this as well as on the preceding potential gains of
giving up the peso.
III.5  Economic Structure and Monetary System Performance in the Southern Hemisphere
It is revealing to compare economic structure and monetary system performance in
a small sample of Southern Hemisphere countries. Argentina, Australia, and New Zealand,
in addition to Chile comprise the group. Argentina, with a currency board since 1991, is
currently considering adoption of the US dollar. New Zealand has a floating exchange rate
regime in place, combined with explicit inflation targeting since 1990. Discussion of a
possible monetary union with Australia has been going on for a decade in New Zealand.
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Australia has also a floating exchange rate in place, coupled to explicit inflation targeting
since 1993. Chile, as mentioned above, has recently adopted a floating exchange rate
system and is strengthening its inflation targeting regime adopted in 1990.
Conventional OCA Criteria
The comparison starts with assessing some conventional OCA criteria across the
four countries (Table 13). Relative trade intensity with the U.S. is highest in Chile, at
20.4% of Chile’s total trade. New Zealand’s trade with Australia is slightly larger, at 22.5%
of New Zealand’s total trade.
As discussed above, Chile’s business cycle and consumption correlations with the
U.S. patterns tend to be negative, particularly during the 1990s. The opposite has occurred
with Argentina’s business cycle correlation with the U.S., which has changed from negative
in the 1980s to positive in the 1990s. By contrast, Australia’s business cycle is very
strongly and positively correlated with that of the U.S.  In the case of New Zealand, the
GDP correlations with both the U.S. and Australia are more ambiguous, ranging from zero
(for GDP growth) to moderately positive and significant (for GDP deviations from trend).
Consumption growth in Australia is not correlated with the U.S. However New Zealand
displays a strong positive consumption correlation with the U.S. but not with Australia.
Specialization of both GDP and exports is comparatively very high in Chile. As
discussed above, Chile’s share of agriculture and mining in GDP is 16% and the share of
commodity exports in total exports is 85%. Although Argentina, Australia, and New
                                                          
24 Among the most recent papers on monetary union issues relevant for New Zealand are Coleman (1999),
Hargreaves (1999), and Hargreaves and McDermott (1999).24
Zealand are commodity exporters among the group of middle and high-income economies,
their production and exports are much more diversified than Chile’s.
In conclusion, OCA criteria for possible adoption of the US dollar are better
satisfied by Argentina, Australia, and New Zealand than by Chile. Chile is the only among
the four countries with significantly negative business cycle and consumption correlations
with the U.S. during the 1990s. In addition its production and exports are far more
specialized than those of the other three countries are. Only Chile’s trade with the U.S. is
larger than the U.S. trade shares of the three other countries.
Monetary System Performance
A major dimension of the performance of a monetary system relates to inflation.
Under a currency board, Argentina has been able to attain a result very close to price
stability; in fact, average annual inflation has been negative at -0.5 % in 1998-99 (Table
14). Australia and New Zealand have recorded average annual inflation rates of 1.2% and
0.03%, respectively. They are consistent with their corresponding inflation target ranges of
1 - 3% and 0 - 3%.  Chile, as discussed above, has recently attained an inflation outcome
that is also consistent with its publicly announced medium-term inflation range of 2-4% per
year.
 In sum, both Argentina’s currency board regime and regimes that combine floating
rates with inflation targeting in Chile, Australia, and New Zealand have been successful in
delivering price stability. As opposed to other countries where dollarization is considered
because of the inability of the local monetary authority to deliver low inflation,
dollarization – or joining a monetary union – is not an option justified by such a concern in
these four countries.
Another dimension to be considered next is exchange risk premiums. A basic
presumption is that countries with more flexible exchange rate regimes should exhibit
larger exchange risk premiums. However this is not observed in the countries considered
here.
25 Last year’s average annualized residual exchange risk premiums (or spreads)
implicit in long-term (10-year) bond spreads are 0.57% for Chile and 0.04% for New
Zealand. Although there is no comparable information on long-term exchange risk
premiums for Argentina, January 2000 1-year exchange risk premium in Argentine peso
futures markets was ca. 5%. An alternative measure of short-term exchange risk premiums
is provided by the difference between local-currency and US- dollar 90-day deposits at
domestic banks. The 1999 annual averages were 3.70 % for Chile and 2.80% for Argentina,
and 0.36% for New Zealand. These spreads are highly volatile in both Chile and
Argentina.
26 The January 2000 spread in New Zealand 0.36%. This evidence suggests that
adoption of a fixed exchange rate – even associated to a currency board – does not
necessarily help to reduce exchange rate premiums. Argentina, 9 years after its adoption of
a currency board, maintains relatively high levels of exchange rate risk premium. In fact,
                                                          
25 Basic data for comparable calculations for Australia were not available.
26 For instance, in May (December) 1999 these exchange risk spreads were 5.5% (0.89%) in Chile and 1.4%
(4.4%) in Argentina.25
high exchange rate risk premiums is one major motivation for Argentina to consider
dollarization (Hausmann and Powell 1999).
Implicit country risk premiums on long-term sovereign U.S. dollar-denominated
debt should not be much affected by the type of monetary system. However they also
display major differences among the four Southern Hemisphere countries. Average 1999
country risk spreads on 10-year sovereign debt paper over 10-year U.S. treasuries attained
1.93% for Chile, 8.56% for Argentina, and 0.83% for New Zealand.
In sum, adoption of fixed exchange rates is no guarantee for attaining low exchange
risk premiums. Nor should it help in reducing country risk premiums. Argentina’s currency
board has delivered higher exchange rate risk and country risk premiums – and hence
higher interest rates – than those observed in other countries with floating rates and
inflation targeting.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This paper has analyzed the pros and cons of giving up the national currency by
either unilateral adoption of a foreign currency or negotiated adoption of a common
currency with prospective partners. First theoretical arguments and empirical evidence
found in the literature on the choice of monetary / exchange rate regimes were reviewed.
Then the costs and benefits of giving up the peso were analyzed for Chile, vis-a-vis
prospective currency partners and in comparison to other Southern Hemisphere countries.
Today’s debate is moving towards whether to have a national currency whose value
is determined by the market or to replace it by some other country’s money or some
regional supranational currency. The international evidence regarding exchange rate
regimes confirms that this as a trend of the last few years. The regime choice involves a
trade-off between credibility and flexibility which cannot be fully solved by either regime.
However, the potential inflationary bias of a floating regime can be dealt with by setting
rules constraining discretion of the monetary authorities, like in an inflation target
framework.
It is striking that most empirical studies find that just a handful of countries comply
with generally accepted preconditions for forming a monetary union. This may explain why
monetary unions were so rare until the birth of the euro. In the end, it takes a strong
conviction, based perhaps on non-economic arguments, to abandon the flexibility of a
floating exchange rate in favor of potential microeconomic benefits reaped by monetary
union.26
The evaluation of monetary / exchange rate regime choice performed in this paper
for Chile was based on a review of the costs and benefits of giving up the peso in
comparison to maintaining the current regime based on inflation targeting and a floating
exchange rate. The main costs of giving up the peso are derived from abolishing or
drastically modifying three policy-making institutions or mechanisms.
The first one is relinquishing national monetary and exchange rate policy, which is
potentially costly for Chile because it involves four possible losses. Higher imported
inflation is a relevant cost if Chile joins a monetary union with partners that exhibit weaker
fiscal and financial fundamentals. Losing nominal exchange rate flexibility can impose
significant employment, output, and welfare losses in a country – like Chile – that faces
intense shocks and substantial temporary wage and price rigidity. Losing monetary policy
has the drawback of giving up on its stabilizing role – a function that has been recently
enhanced with Chile’s attainment of low and stationary inflation. Finally yielding
seignorage to a foreign country or supra-national central bank implies giving up an annual
seignorage cost estimated at 0.2% of GDP and requires buying back from the private sector
the initial currency stock (2.6% of GDP).
Second, regional coordination of fiscal policies among members of a currency union
is highly desirable to take account of macroeconomic spillovers associated with
stabilization policy and externalities related to budget discipline and monetary policy
credibility. Joining a currency union requires developing a system of intra-regional
transfers, particularly in the absence of strong labor mobility, significant price and wage
inflexibility, strongly asymmetric shocks, and high production and income concentration,
as in the case of Chile. Unilateral adoption of a foreign currency without a system of
international fiscal transfers would be very costly in this regard.
Third, it is often argued that giving up the national currency involves sacrificing the
lender-of-last-resort function. This is only partly true, as market-based schemes of liquidity
provision and a growing presence of large international banks are reducing the need for
central bank provision of the latter function. Nonetheless adoption of a foreign currency
would require a clear redefinition of lender-of-last-resort functions and institutions.
Moreover it should include adoption of a banking regulatory and supervisory framework
that is similar to those adopted in other currency partners in order to minimize asymmetric
exposure to moral-hazard behavior and financial crises among currency area members.
Conventional OCA criteria provide a useful first yardstick for evaluating the
convenience of giving up the Chilean peso in favor of unilateral adoption of a foreign
currency or negotiating joining of a currency union with suitable partners. Current mobility
of labor between Chile and prospective partners is extremely limited. Not surprisingly,
differences of unemployment rates are much larger between Chile and prospective partners
than between regions within Chile. Moreover, Chile’s unemployment rate is negatively
correlated with most prospective partners (the exception could be the positive
unemployment correlation coefficient with the U.S. on annual data, which disappears with
the use of quarterly data).27
International financial integration has increased worldwide during the 1990s and so
has it in Chile. Yet large differences in the levels of interest rates and stock market returns
between Chile and prospective partners persist to date. Moreover, correlations of interest
rates between Chile are zero (with 3 countries) and when they were positive and significant
in the 1980s they declined in the 1990s (with 2 countries). Correlations of stock market
returns are positive and significant with the three Latin American countries but zero with
the U.S. and Germany during the last 5 years. Chile’s low degree of physical capital
integration is reflected by a very high 0.94 saving-investment correlation observed since the
early 1980s.
The evidence suggests that wage and price flexibility is relatively low in Chile.
Excepting Argentina, Chile shows the lowest degree of real wage procyclicality among the
six prospective partners. Moreover, while real wages in Chile were procyclical in the late
1980s, they do not correlate with the business cycle after 1991 – a possible sign of
increasing labor market rigidity. Regarding overall indexation of prices of goods, services,
labor, and capital, casual evidence suggests that Chile is still the most indexed country in
the world.
Chile is a very open economy as measured by the low level of trade protection and
the relative size of its foreign trade, in comparison to prospective Latin American partners.
Its trade is regionally diversified.
Chile’s terms of trade – largely influenced by the international prices of its main
exports – are very volatile and only weakly correlated with potential Latin American
currency partners during the last two decades. Correlation of Chile’s terms of trade with the
TT of the U.S. is negative, large, and significant since 1980. Hence Chile is exposed to
international price shocks that are of opposite sign to those affecting the U.S.
Another important OCA criteria is the degree of business cycle correlation, as
measured above alternatively as correlations between GDP growth rates or correlations
between GDP deviations from trends. The evidence shows that Chile’s business cycle is
asynchronic with the business cycles in prospective partner countries. Only when using
annual observations for the full 1980-1998 historical sample, correlations with each of the 5
countries are positive – but this result is strongly determined by positive co-movements
during the 1980s. In contrast, when comparing Chile’s international business cycle
correlations in the 1980s with those during the 1990s, they often turn from positive to
negative. Most of Chile’s quarterly GDP correlations with Argentina, Mexico, and the U.S.
are negative and significant during the 1990s.
Chile’s production and export specialization in commodities and commodity-based
manufactures is very high, exceeding by far the degrees of specialization of Argentina,
Brazil, and Mexico. International portfolio diversification is still low (but higher than in the
three latter countries). While the shares of private pension assets abroad and private foreign
direct investments by Chileans abroad are increasing, the country has still a long way to go
before attaining well-diversified portfolio holdings by its residents, requiring large future
gross capital flows in both directions.28
In sum, conventional economic OCA criteria suggest that Chile is not at all a natural
candidate for joining a monetary union with prospective partners in Latin America, Nafta,
or the European Union. Unilateral dollarization is, from the perspective of OCA criteria,
even less advisable in view of the lack of Chile-U.S. correlation of most relevant variables.
Among non-conventional criteria, Chile’s advanced stage in structural reform and
its sound fiscal stance make it more feasible to adopt a foreign currency. This requires,
however, putting into place adequate arrangements and international institutions to deal
with the sharing of seignorage, the provision of fiscal transfers to compensate for very
asymmetric external and domestic shocks, the provision of public lending of last resort or
development of market-based institutions that provide the latter role. This is difficult but
possible to achieve in the process of a negotiated currency union but much harder to attain
under unilateral adoption of a foreign currency issued by a country larger than Chile by
various orders of magnitude.
Giving up the peso provides four potential microeconomic benefits. Elimination of
the need for currency conversion saves foreign transaction costs by an amount that has been
estimated at 0.4% of GDP per year for the average EMU member. In the case of Chile this
figure could be an appropriate upper bound estimate of this benefit if Chile were to adopt
the U.S. dollar. The corresponding upper-bound estimate if Chile were to join a common
currency with Mercosur would be 0.07% of GDP per year. A second potential benefit –
with little international evidence about its magnitude – could be reaped from less market
segmentation and larger goods market integration. International trade could be boosted by a
lower exchange rate risk – although the international evidence on this effect is
controversial. Finally, elimination of the currency risk premium will reduce domestic
interest rates and hence could boost investment and growth rates.
Chile has followed a long and bumpy road that led to the current adoption of
exchange rate floating and inflation targeting. Only fully in place since September 1999,
this system delivers low inflation. Chile’s regime is as successful as the same regime in
Australia and New Zealand – or as Argentina’s currency board – in yielding price stability.
As opposed to other countries where dollarization is considered because of the inability of
the local monetary authority to deliver low inflation, dollarization – or joining of a
monetary union – is not an option justified by such a concern in Chile.
Comparison of conventional OCA criteria and monetary system performance across
four Southern Hemisphere countries that differ in monetary / exchange rate regimes reveal
significant conclusions. Conventional OCA criteria for possible adoption of the US dollar
are better satisfied by Argentina, Australia, and New Zealand than by Chile. Chile is the
only among the four countries with significantly negative business cycle and consumption
correlations with the U.S. during the 1990s. In addition its production and exports are far
more specialized than those of the other three countries are. Only Chile’s trade with the
U.S. is larger than the U.S. trade shares of the three other countries.
Comparison of exchange rate risk premiums across three countries shows that the
countries with floating rates do not exhibit higher premiums than Argentina, with a29
currency board since 1991. This suggests that adoption of a fixed exchange rate – even
associated to a currency board – does not necessarily help to reduce exchange rate
premiums. In fact, high exchange rate risk premiums is one major motivation for Argentina
to consider dollarization.
Chile’s choice of monetary framework, based on a floating exchange rate and
inflation targeting, has made much progress since the early 1990s, but still needs some
further work. There are two important policy challenges that lie ahead.
(a) Pursue the agenda of improving the inflation targeting scheme currently in progress.
This means: (i) advancing in the transparency of policy making at the Central Bank,
where publication of a formal Inflation Report (scheduled for May 2000) and of
Board minutes with a short delay (to start soon as well) are key pieces; and (ii)
making monetary policy decisions that essentially focus on inflation, with an
explicit target that anchors the economy and limits discretion, but in a framework
that also contains a medium term orientation that builds-in some degree of
flexibility (this implies a forward-looking orientation that requires a significant
model development effort at the Central Bank and hopefully elsewhere as well).
(b) Completing financial deregulation that facilitates more sophisticated financial
markets, including development of hedging instruments to take care of risks that are
inherent to a global economy and a floating exchange rate regime (derivatives,
options, forwards). This has two dimensions: (i) at the domestic front, allow
commercial banks to become relevant actors in the risk sharing business (already in
progress); and (ii) at the foreign front, implement measures that allow development
of the demand for Chilean pesos by foreigners (lifting some capital account
regulations and tax restrictions still in place).
The demand for pesos abroad is essentially of an indirect nature. What is meant is
that there exists the chance for Chilean corporations and financial institutions to place debt
and other financial instruments denominated in pesos in the world markets. As of today, all
our current foreign debt is denominated in currencies different from the peso, and this could
be a reflection of lack of interest of foreign investors in peso-denominated assets. This in
turn limits the development of a deep and efficient market of exchange rate hedging
instruments. This limitation is not fatal, though, as the Central Bank international reserves
are large (about 40% of gross foreign debt), at least half of that debt has been accumulated
by export-oriented firms (naturally hedged), and the private sector has investments abroad
that are equivalent to at least a third of Chile’s foreign debt.
But still, deepening the peso market, both cash and derivatives, is most desirable
given the large swings in currency parities that are normally associated to a floating regime.
The question begging for an answer is whether foreign investors would be willing to
demand Chilean debt denominated in pesos once legal regulations have been lifted. Some
people have advanced a fatalist hypothesis that claims that Latin American countries are30
condemned by their past misbehavior in this respect
27. Once locals (most of the time,
governments themselves) issue debt in the national currency and place it mostly with
foreign investors, they face the time-consistent incentive to repudiate it by resorting to high
inflation, a dynamically sub-optimal action. Foreign investors know this and thus are not
willing to accept the debt at any reasonable price, demanding a heavy discount compared to
debt denominated in hard currencies.
However, this is clearly not applicable to Chile. Indeed, any type of repudiation or
liquidation of local currency denominated debt brings enormous costs. Thus, if a Chilean
government were to take advantage of it, it is not only because of the strategic incentive,
but also because there is a strong disequilibrium somewhere else (typically, an uncontrolled
fiscal budget), which in turn would reflect weak institutions. However, Chile has made
substantial progress in the last quarter century in strengthening economic and social
institutions – and this is widely acknowledged by the markets. More than a decade of fiscal
surpluses
28, a low public debt, and an inflation rate that has converged to industrial- country
levels are the basis upon which Chile has built a strong reputation. This has significantly
raised the cost of any type of strategic move like local debt repudiation – or, more
generally, of resorting to higher inflation taxation again. Besides, an independent central
bank like Chile’s is a serious practical obstacle to such an attempt.
One of the most successful institutions put into place during the last two decades is
the pension system, which as of 1999 has attained pension savings equivalent to 45% of
GDP. About half of these savings are placed in public debt titles
29 denominated in local
currency.
30  Hence if the government were considering repudiating or liquidating its peso
denominated debt to take advantage of its strategic position, it would be risking bankruptcy
of the pension system and, with it, a political revolution and severe disruption of the whole
economy. Is it worth it? Definitely not. Besides, and very importantly, this public debt is
mostly not denominated in pesos, but rather in a unit of account (the “Unidad de Fomento”
or UF) that is indexed to past inflation. Therefore, the option of repudiation or liquidation
by resorting to inflation simply does not exist
31.
In conclusion, Chile has a good chance to be able to place debt in its local currency.
Perhaps the only question left to the markets to decide is the premium they will demand for
holding debt denominated in nominal pesos in comparison to holding UF-indexed peso
debt.
                                                          
27 See Hausmann et al. (1999).
28 Although in 1999 there was a small deficit basically due to the recession.
29 These titles have been issued by the Central Bank, which acted as a fiscal agent in the 1983-85 rescue of the
financial system in transfering resources to the banks and their debtors. The sterilization effort carried out by
the Central Bank in the 1990s to absorb the huge increase in foreign exchange reserves that followed massive
capital inflows did also played a role in the building up of these (mostly long run) titles.
30 Indexed to past inflation. More on this below.
31 Someone could argue that the mechanism of calculation of the UF can be changed, allowing in the end
some accommodation of the eventual government’s interest in reducing its debt value. However, this change
should be operated through a bill of law presented to Congress, which is more difficult than  resorting to
printing money.31
There are two other prerequisites for successful exchange rate floating. First,
maintaining of sound economic policies and fundamentals. This is key to the future of the
peso (and to the future of the country) because the derived exchange rate stability reduces
the micro costs associated to volatility. And second, the keeping the float as clean as
possible. If fundamentals are right, any residual variability of the peso value (beyond the
effects of changes in monetary policy geared at stabilizing the business cycle) should be
attributed to fluctuations in foreign terms of trade and international financial contagion
effects. The latter are less important the stronger the fundamentals and the better the policy
mix (including the floating exchange rate regime). Thus, one can claim that, over time,
contagion effects should decline by simply sticking to sound fundamentals and policies.
This is exactly the recipe applied by Australia and New Zealand, two small open economies
that, ahead of Chile, have successfully implemented the combination of inflation targeting
and floating.
Two final remarks. Disregarding a monetary union or dollarization for Chile at the
current juncture is based on a cost/benefit assessment that relies also on the country’s initial
conditions. In other words, Chile has attained a strong reputation based on a sound financial
system, price stability under control of an autonomous central bank, a diversified and
mature social security system, and respect of the rule of law. Thus any gain from
dollarization or a monetary union is marginal at best and the loss of monetary policy
autonomy could to high a price to pay. If that is so, political support for this type of
decision (particularly dollarization) is very difficult to achieve, the more so given the bad
memories Chileans have of two previous experiences of complete fixing (1959-1962, 1979-
1982) that ended up in severe recessions, financial collapse and high inflation. Hence initial
conditions are quite different from those in other countries contemplating dollarization.
The second remark is that these beneficial initial conditions, combined with the
steps mentioned above to strengthen the peso, are good policy and advice whatever the
monetary/exchange rate regime. If in due time conditions evolve towards the negotiation of
macroeconomic policy coordination or the fulfillment of convergence requirements (like in
Maastricht) with some other suitable countries, then the above mentioned policy
recommendations will put Chile on a strong footing.32
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Data Appendix
Data definitions, sources, and transformations are summarized next.
Table 1
Information on exchange rate regime classification is provided by the International
Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics (IFS). The information corresponds to
regimes as declared by the countries’ authorities and not necessarily to the effective
regimes.
Table 2
Two measures of seignorage are used: the first uses  the annual  growth of currency
over the year’s nominal GDP. Data (except for Chile, where Central Bank information is
used) comes from IFS. The other measure, which tries to capture the cost of engaging in
unilateral dollarization, is comprised by two elements: (i) the cost of replacing the currency
stock with dollars (the average stock of currency over GDP, for the period 1994-98), and
(ii) the annual revenue lost by the home country that gives up its currency, which can be
expressed as:
where S is seignorage as percentage of GDP, M is the nominal stock of currency, P is the
price level, and Y is real GDP. If relevant inflation (i.e. U.S. inflation) is p and domestic
real GDP grows at a constant rate g, seignorage is:
Using  a constant currency ratio to GDP (equal to the average currency ratio to GDP
defined above), seignorage is calculated using specific assumptions on country growth and
U.S. inflation.
Table 3
GDP per capita data is from JP Morgan’s Global Data Watch (GDW). Purchasing-
powerr parity (PPP) GNP per capita data is published by the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators.  GDP growth and inflation estimates for 1999 and forecasts for
2000 and 2001 are taken from JP Morgan´s Latin American Outlook and Global Data
Watch and from the authors’ own projections. Real private consumption growth is
estimated by using annual IFS data on nominal private consumption and CPI series for
1980-1998.
Table 4
Annual unemployment rates are taken from various sources, including IFS,



























GDW. Data for all countries range from 1990 to 1998, with the exception of Germany, with
data only available since 1993.
Real interest rates are market deposit rates taken from IFS. CPI’s annual growth rate
for each quarter (also from IFS) is used to obtain real interest rates. For the case of Chile,
information on real market interest rates (which are directly observed in the market) is from
the Central Bank of Chile. In order to obtain comparable values across countries, the
sample periods for Brazil, Argentina and Mexico are restricted to periods after
hyperinflation or post-stabilization which present either negative or extremely high positive
real interest rates.
Real stock market returns (constructed using CPI inflation) are based on the
following stock market indexes: IPSA (Chile), MERVAL (Argentina), IBOV (Brazil),
HDAX (Germany) and INDU (USA).
Table 5
Information on quarterly real wages is obtained from IFS, International Labor
Organization, the Central Bank of Chile, and the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. The series
are seasonally adjusted and filtered using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. Their deviation
from trend (calculated as the deviation from the HP-filtered series) is compared with the
business cycle (defined below) in each country . The data sample varies with countries,
depending on data availability.
The business cycle (GDP deviation from trend) corresponds to the deviation of
quarterly seasonally adjusted GDP from its HP-filtered value. GDP data are obtained from
IFS, with the exception of Chile, for which Central Bank data is used.
The source of the index of labor reforms is Burky and Perry (1997) and is for 1995.
The extent of price indexation is based on the authors’ estimates.
Table 6
Data on trade/GDP and average tariff levels is from the World Bank’s WDI. The
countries’s share in Chile’s total trade are ratios obtained from data available in the Central
Bank’s Boletín Mensual.
Table 7
Terms of trade (TOT) data for 1980-1995 is from the World Bank. For Chile, a
second series (ranging from 1980 onwards)  is also used in the estimations. Since this is a
monthly series, annual averages are used. The latter series for Chile is a chained Laspeyres
index, with data on export and import prices from the Central Bank and from the IFS. Both
series of Chile’s TOT are used in the table (their correlation is 0.87).
Tables 8, 9 and 10
These tables present simple correlations between Chile and other countries for GDP
growth (annual and quarterly), GDP deviation from trend (annual and quarterly), and
private consumption growth. As stated above, quarterly series are seasonally adjusted, then38
HP-filtered to obtain deviations from trend. Annual series are also filtered using HP. Only
significant lagged correlations are reported. Data sources are the same as previously stated.
Table 11
Information on output structure and the share of primary products in exports is from
ECLAC’s Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean.
Table 12
The overall structural reform indicator and the capital account liberalization indexes
are from Morley, Machado and Petinato (1998). Government debt and fiscal balance ratios
are obtained from JP Morgan’s Global Data Watch.
Table 13
Trade information is taken from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics. Simple
correlations and data procedures and sources are the same as in previous tables.
Table 14
Data sources on inflation and real market (deposit) interest rates for Australia and
New Zealand are the same as for the other countries, mentioned above. Information on risk
premiums is taken from Bloombergs.  To calculate the long-term exchange rate risk spread,
a local currency-denominated Treasury bond of 10-year maturity is compared with a similar
U.S. instrument. For the case of Chile, the comparison is made against the 1-year Treasury
bond that pays a real interest  rate. The two instruments, differing by country of origin and
currency, should present rates that differ by both sources of risk. However, as the country
spread is obtained first (see below), the estimation of the long-term (10 year) currency risk
spread is obtained residually.
The short- term currency risk spread is calculated by simple difference between 90-
day local deposit rates in local currency and in US dollars. The country risk spread is
calculated as the percentage premium over 10-year U.S. Treasury bonds implicit in
secondary-market trading of 10-year sovereign government debt in US dollars.Figure 1

















Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.Table 1
Country Distribution by Exchange Rate Regimes (April 1999)
Number of Countries Percentage
Common Currency 37 20
Currency Boards 8 4.3
Fixed Exchange Rates 44 23.8
Horizontal Bands 8 4.3
Moving Rates 6 3.2
Moving Bands 9 4.9
Managed Floating without a
previously announced target
25 13.5
Independent Floating 48 25.9
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.Table 2
Seignorage
Chile Argentina Brazil Mexico United States Germany
Seigniorage/GDP (1)
(%, Average,1995-1998)
Initial loss from dollarization (2)
(% of GDP, average 1994-1998)




















(1) Ratio of annual (december to december) growth in currency to nominal annual GDP.
(2) Ratio of december currency stock to nominal annual GDP
(3)Assuming currency/GDP as in (2), USA inflation of 2.5% and GDP growth of 5% for Chile, 3.5% for Brazil and Argentina and 4.5% for Mexico.
Source: Authors´ calculations based on raw data from IMF and Central Bank of Chile .Table 3
Growth and Inflation
Chile Argentina Brazil Mexico USA Germany
Income
Per capita GDP
(1998,in  US$ at market exchange rate)
PPP Per capita GNP




























Average    (1986-1998)
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Real Private Consumption Growth (%)














Source: IMF, World Bank, JP Morgan, Authors’ Projections.Table 4
Factor Markets




Correlation with Chile (Annual, 1990-1998)



















Real Market Interest Rate (Annual) (1)
Average (Quarterly, 1986:1-1999:3) 6.3 6.2  (93:3-99:3) 17.7  (95:3-99:3) 0.14   (92:3-98:3) 2.7 2.6



















Stock Market Real Return (Annual Rate)




















Correlation Between National Saving and






















Source: IMF, CEPAL, World Bank.
(1) In order to have comparable values of average real interest rates between the countries, the samples for Brazil, Argentina and Mexico are adjusted, not
considering hyperinflation or adjustment periods, which present either negative or extremely high values.
(2) Correlations for this period, in the case of the South American countries, correspond to the sample for which the average real interest rate for each country is
presented.Table 5
Wage and Price Flexibility
Chile Argentina Brazil Mexico USA Germany
Index of Labor Market Reform
(1995) (1)
2 -1.1 -2.3 -3.3 n.a. n.a.
Correlation Between Real Wage Deviation and

















Price Indexation High Medium Low Low Low Medium
Source: IMF, International Labor Organization, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Central Bank.
(1)  Source: Burki, S. and G. Perry (1997). The labor market reform index, centered on zero, is built by aggregating over a series of indicators of labor market
restrictions. The index increases with the degree of labor market deregulation or reform. The highest value of the index for Latin America and the Caribbean is 4
(for Bahamas and Jamaica) and the lowest is –3.3 (for Nicaragua and Panama).Table 6
Trade Openness and Regional Interdependence





56 20 18 n.a. 60 25 n.a. 47 n.a.
Mean Tariff (%) (1998) 11 13.5 14.6 n.a. 13.3 5.2 n.a 6 n.a.
Trade with Chile
(1998)
Trade (% of Chilean total
exports and imports)
8.1 5.8 14.6 2 20.4 24.4 4.1 24.9
Exports  (% of Chilean total
exports)
5 5.3 11.1 3.3 17.7 21.9 3.1 28.1
Imports (% of Chilean total
imports)
10.7 6.1 17.6 0.8 22.6 26.2 4.6 21.6
Source: IMF, Banco Central de Chile, World Bank.Table 7
External Shocks
   Chile Argentina Brazil Mexico USA Germany
Terms of Trade (TT) (1)
TT Coefficient of Variation  (Annual, 1980-1995)
TT1 (TT2) for Chile
17.7 (7.9) 11.8 8.9 21.3 4.7 6.8
TT Correlation with Business Cycle  (Annual, 1980-1995).
TT1 (TT2) for Chile
0.55 (0.28) 0.33 0.55 0.34 -0.41 -0.001
TT Correlations with Chile
Annual, 1960-1995.  TT1 for Chile
Annual 1980-1995.  TT1 for Chile
















Source: IMF, World Bank, Central Bank of Chile.
(1) Two alternative terms of trade measures for Chile were used. TT1 is a Central Bank of Chile TT series available on request. TT2 is a World Bank TT series.Table 8
Symmetry of Business Cycles: Output Growth
Argentina Brazil Mexico USA Germany
Correlations with Chile








































































































Note:  Lagged correlations are reported only when significant.
Source: Author’s calculations based on raw data from IMF, World Bank, and Central Bank of Chile.Table 9
Symmetry of Business Cycles: Output Deviation from Trend
Argentina Brazil Mexico USA Germany
Correlations with Chile








































































































Note:  Lagged correlations are reported only when significant.
Source: Author’s calculations based on raw data from IMF, World Bank, and Central Bank of Chile.Table 10
Symmetry of Private Consumption
Argentina Brazil Mexico USA Germany
Correlations with Chile




























































































Note:  Lagged correlations are reported only when significant.
Source: Author’s calculations based on raw data from IMF and ECLAC.Table 11
Output and Portfolio Diversification
Chile Argentina Brazil Mexico
Structure of Output
(% of GDP in mining and
agriculture, 1997)




84.8 65.8 46.9 19.3
Share of Pension Assets
in GDP
(%, 1999)
7 <1 <1 <1
Source: CEPAL, World Bank.Table 12
Non-Conventioanl Optimal Currency Area Criteria
Chile Argentina Brazil Mexico United States Germany
Level of Structural Reforms
Overall Reform Indicator (1) (1995)
















38 38 42 27 62 64
Fiscal balance/GDP
(%) (1999)
-1.5 -2.3 -10 -1.3 3.5 -1.9
(1) and (2) the source is : Morley, Machado and Petinato (1999). The highest value of the overall structural index is 0.891 (for Uruguay) and the lowest 0.667 (for
Venezuela). For the capital account liberalization index the largest value is for Argentina and the lowest is for Brazil.
Source: IMF, JP Morgan.Table 13
Conventional OCA Criteria in Four Southern- Hemisphere Countries
Chile Argentina Australia New Zealand
Trade Intensity with the United States
(with Australia)
Total trade with the US (% of the Country’s
total trade)
(1998)
20.4 14.4 16.2 15.8 (22.5)












































(% of GDP in mining and agriculture)
(1997 for Chile, and Argentina, 1993 for
Australia and New Zealand)
15.7 10.2 9.1 11.5
Source: Author’s calculations based on raw data from IMF. ECLATable 14
Inflation and Interest Rates in Four Southern Hemisphere Countries












Real Interest Rate (%, Annual)
Real Interest Rate on Quarterly Bank Deposits (1986:1-1999:3) 6.7 3.4 3.9 5.2
Exchange-Rate Risk and Country Risk Premiums (%, Annual)
(Average 1999)
Exchange-Rate Risk Spread on Long-term Sovereign Bonds (1)
Exchange-Rate Risk Spread on Short-term Bank Deposits (2)














Source: IMF, Bloomberg, JP Morgan.
(1)  Exchange-rate risk spreads on long-term (10-year maturity) sovereign bonds are calculated from local Treasury local currency-denominated bonds and a
similar U.S. Treasury bond. For the case of Chile (News Zealand), the comparison is made between 10-year bonds paying a real (nominal) interest  rate. The
calculated differences in yields reflect the sum of exchange- rate risk and country risk premiums. Using the country risk premiums explained in note 3 below,
currency risk premiums are obtained residually .
(2)  The short- term currency risk spread is calculated by the simple comparison of the countries´ 90-day deposit rate in local currency and in US dollars.
(3) Country risk spreads are calculated as percentage premiums above 10-year U.S. Treasury bonds implicit in secondary-market trading of 10-year sovereign
government debt denominated in US dollars.
(4)   Based on January 2000 rates.Documentos de Trabajo
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